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Abstract
We build a theoretical model to study the welfare effects and resulting policy im-
plications of firms’ market power in a frictional labor market. Our environment has
two main characteristics: wages play a role in allocating labor across firms and there
is a finite number of agents. We find that the decentralized equilibrium is inefficient
and that the firms’ market power results in the misallocation of workers from the high-
to the low-productivity firms. A minimum wage forces the low-productivity firms to
increase their wage, leading them to hire even more often thereby exacerbating the
inefficiencies. Moderate unemployment benefits can increase welfare because they limit
firms’ market power by improving the workers’ outside option.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we study the welfare effects and resulting policy implications that arise when
firms have market power in the labor market. To that end, we examine a directed search
model with a finite number of agents. We find that the firms’ market power results in
inefficiencies by causing the misallocation of workers across firms. The policy implications
are that a minimum wage is always detrimental to welfare while unemployment benefits may
improve welfare.
In our model workers are homogeneous, firms differ in their productivity and each firm
has one vacancy. The split of the surplus is endogenously determined during the hiring
process: first every firm posts a wage and then each worker observes all postings and applies
for one job.1 Frictions are introduced by assuming that workers cannot coordinate their
application decisions with each other. To study a setting where firms have market power, we
focus our attention on a version of this model with a finite number of agents. We show that
the decentralized allocation is inefficient: the more (less) productive firms hire less (more)
often than is optimal; furthermore, unemployment is too low because workers apply to safe
low-wage/low-productivity jobs too frequently.
The culprit for the inefficiency is the market power that firms enjoy in a a finite market,
in the sense that a single firm’s action affects the equilibrium outcomes of all agents. Indeed,
constrained efficiency obtains in large markets where firms do not have market power (Moen
(1997), Shi (2001), Shimer (2005)). Market power reduces the elasticity of the hiring proba-
bility with respect to the wage and, as a result, all firms post wages that are lower than at the
efficient benchmark. This redistributes surplus from workers to firms which is a feature that
is shared with frictionless models of monopsony (Bhaskar, Manning and To (2002)). A novel
feature of our model is that the incentive to reduce wages is stronger for high productivity
(and in equilibrium high-wage) firms which leads them to reduce wages disproportionally.
This results in the reallocation of workers from the high- to the low-productivity firms which
turns out to be inefficient. Furthermore, since high-wage jobs are harder to get, a side-effect
of this misallocation is that the unemployment rate is lower in the decentralized equilibrium
than in the efficient benchmark. Therefore, market power increases employment but reduces
output (and hence welfare) by decreasing the average productivity of employed workers. This
source of inefficiencies is new to the directed search literature.
We examine the welfare effects of two labor market interventions: minimum wages and
1Most of the directed search literature restricts attention to a single application as a way of capturing
the time-consuming aspect of the job-finding process. Multiple applications were recently introduced in
continuum directed search models by Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (2006), Galenianos and Kircher (2009a)
and Kircher (2008).
2
unemployment benefits. A minimum wage constraints the low productivity firms to offer
higher wages than they otherwise would and hence hire even more often than in the origi-
nal equilibrium, thereby exacerbating the inefficiencies. Introducing unemployment benefits
results in the reallocations of workers towards high productivity firms because it improves
the outside option of workers effectively reducing the firms’ market power. In one sense,
unemployment benefits act as a subsidy to search and reduce firms’ market power. This
is on top of any additional benefits that may be derived from better match formation (e.g.
Marimon and Zilibotti (1999)). In terms of employment effects, introducing a minimum wage
(unemployment benefits) reallocates workers to the low (high) productivity firms; since low
productivity firms offer a higher probability of employment, the minimum wage reduces the
unemployment rate while benefits increase it.2 Therefore, our model shows that evaluating
the welfare implications of labor market policy based on their employment effects alone can
lead to misleading results.
We emphasize that even though both policies redistribute surplus towards the workers,
they have diametrically opposing effects on aggregate welfare. This is interesting because it
contrasts with the predictions of many recent frictional models where both policy instruments
yield the same qualitative welfare implications (Acemog˘lu and Shimer (1999), Acemog˘lu
(2001), Manning (2004)).3 However, wages have no allocative role in these models, either
because agents are assumed to be identical or because wages are set through bargaining
after a match has formed. When we introduce an allocative role for wages by giving firms
a non-trivial wage-setting decision in an environment with productivity heterogeneity the
qualitative similarity across policy instruments disappears.4
The next section describes the model. Most of the insights of our model can be conveyed
in the simple setting with two workers and two firms which is examined in Section 3. Section
4 generalizes our results. We discuss the relevance of our results and conclude in Section 5.
2 The Environment
We begin with a brief description of the environment.
2These employment effects do not hinge on the finite nature of the market, as we discuss in the conclusions.
Of course, the policies’ normative effects do depend on the size of the market.
3These papers span the three most popular classes of labor search models: directed search, random search
with bargained wages and random search with posting, respectively. Acemog˘lu and Shimer (1999) do not
explicitly consider a minimum wage but it is easy to show that it has the same effect as their prescribed
unemployment benefits, as also remarked in Acemog˘lu (2001).
4A different modeling approach is taken by Kaas and Madden (2008). They consider a two-firm Hotelling
model and show that a minimum wage reduces the firms’ market power and leads to a welfare improvement.
In that model the wage does play an allocative role.
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The economy is populated with a finite number of risk-neutral workers and firms, denoted
by N = {1, ..., n} and M = {1, ...,m} respectively, where n ≥ 2 and m ≥ 2. Each firm j
has one vacancy and is characterized by its productivity level xj, where xj > 0 for all j. We
assume without loss of generality that xm ≤ xm−1 ≤ ... ≤ x1 ≡ x. The productivity of all
firms is common knowledge.5 The profits of firm j are equal to xj−wj if it employs a worker
at wage wj and zero otherwise. All workers are identical and the utility of a worker is equal
to his wage if employed and zero otherwise.
The hiring process has three stages:
1. Each firm j posts a wage wj ∈ [0, x].
2. Workers observe the wage announcement w = {w1, w2, ..., wm} ∈ [0, x]m and each
worker simultaneously applies to one firm.
3. A firm that receives one or more applicants hires one of these workers at random. A
firm without applicants remains idle.
We focus our attention on equilibria with pure wage-posting strategies by the firms and
we solve for the subgame perfect equilibria of the game. As is standard in the directed
search literature, we restrict attention to equilibria where workers follow symmetric strategies.
Symmetric strategies mean that, following any wage announcement, every worker applies to
firm j with the same probability for all j ∈ M . This assumption rules out coordination
among workers and it is a natural way of introducing trading frictions.6 It is straightforward
to extend this environment to introduce our two policy variables: a minimum wage puts a
lower bound on the wages that firms can post; unemployment benefits increase the value of
remaining unemployed. This is the standard directed search environment, for instance as in
Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001, henceforth BSW).7
5The case where productivity levels are private information is examined in Galenianos and Kircher (2007).
6Lack of coordination may seem incompatible with a finite (or, small) labor market. What we have in
mind is that the labor market for some occupation may have a small number of participants while the total
number of agents in the geographical vicinity is large enough to preclude coordination among them.
7We take the trading mechanism and the associated coordination failures as given. The coordination
problem would be less severe if the contracts were posted by the workers rather than the firms, as in Coles
and Eeckhout (2003a, 2003b). However, in that environment the firms do not obtain any surplus and they
would therefore prefer to offer the contracts themselves rather than apply for workers’ services if given the
choice. Analyzing the effects of competing markets is beyond the scope of our paper (see Halko, Kultti
and Virrankoski (2008) for such a model). Virag (2008) considers a model of competing mechanisms with
finite markets where the firms take their market power into account, but that paper assumes that firms are
homogeneous.
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3 The Case of Two Workers and Two Firms
We begin our analysis by examining the case where n = m = 2 and x1 > x2.
8 We find
it fruitful to start with this case as it allows for a simple characterization of the subgame
while preserving the strategic interaction among the agents. The general case is considered
in section 4.
This section’s results are the following.
Proposition 3.1 When n = m = 2 and x1 > x2:
1. Equilibrium Characterization: A unique directed search equilibrium exists. The more
productive firm posts a higher wage (w1 > w2).
2. Efficiency Properties: Constrained efficiency does not obtain in equilibrium. The low
productivity firm hires too often and unemployment is too low from an efficiency view-
point. The firms’ market power is the source of the inefficiency.
3. Policy Implications: Introducing a binding minimum wage reduces welfare. There exists
a (strictly positive) level of unemployment benefits that leads to the constrained efficient
allocation.
3.1 Equilibrium Characterization
We show that there exists a unique equilibrium and that the high productivity firm offers a
higher wage. Even though this result is not new (or surprising), we think the proof is useful
for the efficiency analysis of the following section.
The model is solved by backwards induction. The first step is to derive the equilibrium
response of the two workers for an arbitrary wage announcement {w1, w2}. To facilitate
exposition the two workers are named A and B. Suppose that worker B’s strategy is to
visit firm j with probability pBj . We proceed to derive the probability that worker A is hired
conditional on applying to firm j, which we denote by G(pBj ). Worker B applies to firm
k (6= j) with probability 1 − pBj , in which case A is hired for sure; with probability pBj , B
applies to firm j and A is hired with probability 1/2. Therefore:
G(pBj ) = (1− pBj ) +
pBj
2
=
2− pBj
2
. (1)
8The case where x1 = x2 and n = m = 2 is exhaustively analyzed by BSW.
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The expected utility that worker A receives from applying to firm j is equal to G(pBj )wj =
[(2− pBj ) wj]/2 and similarly for B. Finally, in a symmetric subgame we have pAj = pBj = pj.
We define market utility to be the utility that workers expect to receive in the equilibrium
of the subgame and denote it by U(w1, w2) ≡ maxj G(pj) wj. When wj ≥ 2wk, applying to
firm j is a dominant strategy for the workers which leads to
pj = 1, pk = 0 and U(w1, w2) =
wj
2
. (2)
When wj/wk ∈ [1/2, 2], workers mix (pl > 0 for l = 1, 2). Their strategies and market utility
are given by:
(2− pj) wj
2
=
(2− pk) wk
2
= U(w1, w2). (3)
Equations (2) and (3) define the optimal response of workers {p1(w1, w2), p2(w1, w2)} for
arbitrary wages {w1, w2}. We shall show that only equation (3) is relevant for equilibrium.
We now turn to the firms’ problem in the first stage of the hiring process. Let H(pj)
denote the probability that firm j fills its vacancy when the workers’ strategy is to apply to
j with probability pj. Firm j hires a worker unless it receives no applicants, which occurs
with probability (1− pj)2. Therefore, H(pj) = 1− (1− pj)2.
Firm j takes as given the wage of firm k and the response of workers and maximizes
Πj(wj, wk) ≡ (xj − wj)H(pj(wj, wk)) (4)
over wj ∈ [0, xj]. Note that firm j has no incentive to post a wage above 2wk since that wage
attracts both workers with probability 1. Therefore, in equilibrium pj(wj, wk) is determined
by equation (3) alone.
Differentiating equation (4) with respect to wj yields:
dΠj(wj, wk)
dwj
= (xj − wj)H ′(pj(wj, wk))dpj(wj, wk)
dwj
−H(pj(wj, wk)) (5)
The first term captures the marginal benefit of raising the wage, i.e. the increase in the
hiring probability times productivity. The second term represents the cost of having to pay
a higher wage to workers. We will use this expression extensively for the efficiency analysis.
It will prove convenient to optimize over pj rather than wj. Using equation (3) one can
express wj as a function of pj and wk which, recalling that pk = 1− pj, leads to wj(pj, wk) =
6
(1 + pj) wk/(2− pj). With a bit of algebra, equation (4) can be rewritten as
Πj[wj(pj, wk), wk] = xj(1− (1− pj)2)− wkpj(1 + pj), (6)
and it is maximized over pj ∈ [0, 1]. The first derivative is:
dΠj[wj(pj, wk), wk]
dpj
= 2 (1− pj) xj − (1 + 2 pj) wk. (7)
We equate (7) to zero for both firms, solve for xj and combine terms, using equation (3)
to substitute out wages, to get:
x1
x2
=
1− p2
1− p1
1 + 2 p1
1 + 2 p2
2− p1
2− p2 (8)
Equation (8) implicitly characterizes the equilibrium. It is straightforward to show that
there are unique {p∗1(x1, x2), p∗2(x1, x2)} satisfying (8). Let R(p1) denote the right hand side
of equation (8), where p2 = 1− p1. Simple calculations show that R(0) = 0, R′(p1) > 0 and
limp1→1 R(p1) = ∞ proving that there is a unique p∗1 (and p∗2) satisfying (8) and hence the
equilibrium exists and it is unique.
The equilibrium wages are given by using equation (7):
w∗k(x1, x2) =
2(1− p∗j(x1, x2)) xj
1 + 2 p∗j(x1, x2)
. (9)
The symmetry of (8) and x1 > x2 imply p
∗
1 > 1/2 > p
∗
2 and hence w
∗
1 > w
∗
2. Note that p
∗
1
is strictly interior regardless of x1 and x2. In other words, the high productivity firm finds
it suboptimal to price its competitor out of the market.9 Finally, recalling equation (1), the
expected unemployment rate of the decentralized equilibrium is:
u∗ = p∗1 (1− p∗1 +
p∗1
2
) + p∗2 (1− p∗2 +
p∗2
2
) =
1
2
[1 + 2 p∗1 − 2 (p∗1)2] (10)
3.2 Efficiency Properties of Equilibrium
We now examine the efficiency properties of the equilibrium. We have two main results: first,
efficiency does not obtain; second, the pattern of inefficiency is that the low productivity firm
hires too often and unemployment is too low. We identify the market power enjoyed by firms
in a finite market as the culprit for the inefficiency.
9This result is particular to the two firm case. In the general m-firm model additional assumptions on
productivity are needed to guarantee that all firms attract applications. See Galenianos and Kircher (2009b).
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Our benchmark for efficiency is the solution to the following problem: a social planner
chooses the strategies of the agents to maximize output subject to the constraint that workers’
strategies are symmetric.10 The constraint means that the planner is subject to the same
frictions as the agents, and we call the solution to his problem the constrained efficient
benchmark. This is the standard notion of constrained efficiency in a decentralized matching
process as in Shi (2001) or Shimer (2005).
The firms’ strategies (wage-posting) are irrelevant for efficiency since they only affect the
distribution of the surplus. Therefore, the planner chooses the workers’ strategies to solve
max
p1,p2
x1 H(p1) + x2 H(p2) (11)
s.t. p1 + p2 = 1 and pj ≥ 0, j = 1, 2.
Let {pP1 , pP2 } denote the solution of this problem.
The trade-off faced by the social planner is the following: by increasing p1, he raises the
average productivity of an employed worker because the high productivity firm is left idle
less often; however, he also reduces the number of employed workers since they crowd each
other out more often at the high productivity firm (p1 > 1/2 is clearly a necessary condition
for efficiency). We proceed to show that the decentralized equilibrium does not strike the
welfare-maximizing balance between these two forces.
Setting the first derivative of (11) to zero yields
x1
x2
=
1− pP2
1− pP1
, (12)
Comparing equation (12) with equilibrium condition (8) it is clear that constrained efficiency
does not obtain in equilibrium, except in the special case x1 = x2.
Furthermore, simple calculations show that the product of the second and third ratios on
the right hand side of (8) is larger than 1 which implies that (1−p∗2)/(1−p∗1) < (1−pP2 )/(1−
pP1 ), and therefore
pP2 < p
∗
2 <
1
2
< p∗1 < p
P
1 . (13)
That is, in equilibrium workers apply to the less productive firm too often. As a result, the
unemployment rate is too low from an efficiency viewpoint: equation (10) is minimized at
p1 = 1/2 which, together with equation (13), leads to u
∗ < uP .
10In other words, the planner has a utilitarian welfare function.
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Market power is the source of the inefficiency. Market power refers to the fact that an
individual firm’s action alters the workers’ market utility. To clarify this point, use equation
(3) to rewrite the probability that a worker applies to firm j as
pj = pj[U,wj] = 2(1− U/wj), (14)
where, of course, U = U(w1, w2). A change in wj affects pj[wj, U ] through two distinct
channels. The directed search channel is that as a firm raises its wage, workers increase their
probability of applying there. The market power channel is that a single firm’s wage affects
the workers’ market utility and hence their strategies. Mathematically:
dpj
dwj
=
∂pj
∂wj
+
∂pj
∂U
∂U
∂wj
(15)
It is straightforward to show that the constrained efficient allocation obtains if the market
power channel is shut off (i.e. if ∂U/∂wj = 0). For instance, this is the case in Montgomery
(1991) who considers a similar model but assumes that firms behave competitively in that
they take market utility as fixed when deciding what wage to post. Furthermore, Peters
(2000) shows that market power diminishes as the number of agents grows which is consistent
with the findings of Moen (1997), Shi (2001) and Shimer (2005) that constrained efficiency
obtains in large markets.
To see why market power leads low productivity firms to “overhire” we examine equation
(15) in some more detail. First, note that ∂pj/∂U < 0: a better outside option makes workers
more picky. Second, observe that in a finite market we have ∂U/∂wj > 0: as wj increases,
workers apply more often to firm j and, therefore, less often to firm k; this makes it easier
to be hired at firm k, which leads to an increase in G(pk)wk and hence in market utility.
Note that when the number of agents becomes large this argument ceases to hold because
the queues at other firms are affected infinitesimally as workers increase their probability of
applying to j. Therefore, in a large market the expected utility of applying to some other
firm k remains unchanged and pj increases sufficiently to bring the payoffs of applying to j
down to its previous level.
These observations imply that market power decreases the elasticity of hiring with respect
to the wage by reducing the right-hand side of equation (15). As a result, firms face less
competition and they post lower wages than they would if they did not take their market
power into consideration, as in Montgomery (1991). The reason why the high productivity
firm is affected by this feature to a larger amount has to do with the strict concavity of the
hiring function H(pj). Recalling equation (5), it is easy to see that a unit decrease in dpj/dwj
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has a smaller effect on the hiring probability of the high wage (and hence high productivity)
firm. Therefore, the high productivity firm will respond to market power by decreasing its
wage by a larger amount, which leads to the misallocation of workers.
The firms’ market power therefore leads to a redistribution of surplus from workers to
firms, which does not enter our welfare criterion, but also to a reduction in expected output
due to the misallocation of workers across heterogeneous firms, which does. The source of
the inefficiencies is different from the underutilization of labor suggested by more common
frictionless models of monopsony (e.g. Bhaskar, Manning and To (2002)). The result that in
equilibrium workers under-apply to the more productive firms and face lower unemployment
than is optimal is similar in flavor to Acemog˘lu and Shimer (1999). The driving force in that
paper, however, is the workers’ risk aversion, while in this paper it is the firms’ market power.
More importantly, the focus of the two papers is quite different: we focus on the interaction
between policy and firms’ pricing decisions while Acemog˘lu and Shimer (1999) concentrate
on how to counter the effects of workers’ risk aversion.
3.3 Policy implications
The next step is to examine whether policy can improve on the decentralized allocation. We
consider two policy interventions: a minimum wage and unemployment benefits. Our findings
are that the introduction of a minimum wage exacerbates the misallocation of workers while
an unemployment benefits scheme can achieve constrained efficiency. We provide a discussion
of these results at the end of the section.
We first consider the minimum wage and show that a binding minimum wage results in
the reductions of more productive firm’s hiring probability. Fix the original economy {x1, x2},
label the equilibrium before the introduction of a (binding) minimum wage as unconstrained
and denote the equilibrium wages and application probabilities by {w∗1(x1, x2), w∗2(x1, x2)}
and {p∗1, p∗2}. Introduce a minimum wage in the interval w ∈ (w∗2(x1, x2), x2),11 and label the
resulting equilibrium as constrained with associated wages and probabilities {wC1 (x1, x2, w), w}
and {pC1 , pC2 }.12
The constrained equilibrium of economy {x1, x2} features the same wages and probabilities
as the unconstrained equilibrium of an alternative economy {x1, x˜2} where w is the low
productivity firm’s profit maximizing wage. In other words, the alternative economy is such
11A minimum wage below w∗2(x1, x2) has no effect because it does not bind, while if w ≥ x2 the low
productivity firm is priced out of the market. It is clear from equation (12) that it is never efficient to leave
one of the firms without applications. Depending on parameter values, closing firm 2 down could improve
efficiency but this is not a policy that we will consider.
12Set w2 = w in equation (7) and solve for w1.
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that w∗2(x1, x˜2) = w and w
∗
1(x1, x˜2) = w
C
1 (x1, x2, w). It is straightforward to see that x˜2 > x2
which implies that the low productivity firm of the alternative economy hires more often than
its counterpart in the original economy. Therefore, introducing a minimum wage leads to
low productivity firm to hire more often, pushing the economy further away from efficiency:
pP1 > p
∗
1 > p
C
1 . Note, however, that the expected unemployment rate decreases as a result of
the minimum wage: uC < u∗ < uP .
We now consider an unemployment benefits scheme that gives b (< x2) to every worker
who was unable to find a job and is financed by lump-sum taxation.13 This scheme is
simply a redistribution of resources and therefore it does not affect the efficient allocation.
For the equilibrium analysis, we normalize all values by the unemployment benefits: let
xˆj = xj − b and wˆj = wj − b be the productivity and wage, respectively, in excess of the
workers’ unemployment benefits (or, outside option). Treating xˆj as the firms productivity
and wˆ as the wage, the equilibrium can be characterized in the same way as in section 3.1.
Equation (8) becomes
x1 − b
x2 − b =
1− p2(b)
1− p1(b)
1 + 2 p1(b)
1 + 2 p2(b)
2− p1(b)
2− p2(b) (16)
Equation (16) defines the equilibrium worker strategies for given b, p1(b). The ratio (x1 −
b)/(x2 − b) is strictly increasing in b and p1(b) can achieve any value in [p∗1, 1) by varying b
within [0, x2). p1(x2) = 1 is too high because it is inefficient to price the low productivity
firm out of the market and p1(0) is too low, as was shown in section 3.2. Therefore, there is
a unique b∗ ∈ (0, x2) such that p1(b∗) = pP1 and efficiency is restored.
The main lesson of section 3.2 is that the market power of firms leads to inefficiencies.
This, of course, is not a new result. What is novel in our model is how the inefficiencies mani-
fest themselves and the resulting implications with respect to two policies that can reduce the
firms’ market power. In contrast to frictionless models of monopsony where the inefficiencies
are due to the underutilization of labor and where a (carefully chosen) minimum wage helps
move towards efficiency, our model shows that the allocative inefficiencies are important and
they are actually made worse by a minimum wage. A minimum wage constraints the low
productivity firms to offer higher wages than they otherwise would and hence hire even more
often than in the original, already inefficient, equilibrium. In some sense, the minimum wage
13Of course, in reality taxation is distortionary. Our goal is to examine whether unemployment benefits
can improve the allocation in the most favorable environment possible: if the answer is negative, then a more
realistic assessment of taxation is unnecessary; if, as already anticipated, the answer is positive, then one can
consider different taxation schemes –which we leave for future research.
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mostly affects the low productivity firms which are not principally responsible for the ineffi-
ciency. Therefore, even though the minimum wage results in a redistribution of surplus from
firms to workers, it also reduces aggregate welfare. Introducing an appropriately measured
unemployment benefits scheme can help overcome the inefficiencies. The reason is that un-
employment benefits introduce a positive fallback option for the workers in case they do not
get the job and this option is exercised with higher probability when a worker applies to the
high productivity firm. Therefore, the workers are willing to take more “risk” which induces
high productivity firms to offer higher wages.
It is worth reiterating that in other frictional models that exhibit inefficiencies, but where
prices do not have an allocative role, the welfare effects of introducing a minimum wage are
qualitatively similar to those of introducing unemployment benefits, unlike the results of our
model. For instance, see Acemog˘lu and Shimer (1999), Acemog˘lu (2001) or Manning (2004).
4 The General Case
We now extend our results to the general case of arbitrary but finite numbers of workers
and firms. We replicate the analysis of section 3. The existence and characterization of
equilibrium is analyzed in Galenianos and Kircher (2009b) so section 4.1 simply describes
the model. The subsequent sections generalize our inefficiency result and examine the effects
of policy.
4.1 Equilibrium Characterization
In this section we describe the agents’ maximization problem for the general case of n workers
and m firms.
The strategy of worker i specifies the probability with which he applies to each firm after
observing a particular announcement w = (w1, w2, ..., wm). Let p
i
j(w) denote the probability
that worker i applies to firm j after observing w. Since workers follow symmetric strategies,
we have pij(w) = p
l
j(w) = pj(w), for all i, l ∈ N . We denote the strategy of all workers with
the vector p(w) = (p1(w), ..., pm(w)).
Consider a worker who applies to firm j. The probability that he is hired depends on the
number of other workers that have applied for the same job. When there are exactly nj other
workers at firm j, our worker gets the job with probability 1/(nj + 1). The number of other
workers that visit firm j follows a binomial distribution with parameters (pj, n − 1) when
their strategy is to apply to firm j with probability pj. It is straightforward to sum over the
12
binomial coefficients and derive that the probability of being hired by firm j is given by
G(pj) =
1− (1− pj)n
n pj
,
where G(0) ≡ limpj→0G(pj) = 1.14 Also, let g(pj) ≡ G′(pj) = −[G(pj) − (1− pj)n−1]/pj for
pj > 0 and g(0) ≡ limpj→0 g(pj) = −(n− 1)/2.
The worker’s expected utility from applying to firm j is G(pj) vj. Utility maximization
implies that the expected utility received by a worker is the same at all the firms where he
applies, i.e. G(pj)wj = G(pk)wk = U(w), whenever pj, pk > 0. Define uj(w) ≡ g(pj(w)) wj.
Firm j hires a worker unless it receives no applicants which occurs with probability
(1− pj)n. Therefore, firm j hires with probability
H(pj) = 1− (1− pj)n.
Define h(pj) ≡ H ′(pj) = n (1− pj)n−1.
Firm j takes as given the announcements of the other firms, w−j, and the response of
workers in the subgame, p(w). Firm j maximizes its expected profits:
Πj(wj,w−j) = (xj − wj)H(pj(w)). (17)
Profits are uniquely determined given w since each announcement leads to a unique set of
application probabilities in the subgame (Peters (1984)).
Galenianos and Kircher (2009b) prove the existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies
by firms. Furthermore, under an additional condition it is shown that the equilibrium is
characterized by the firms’ first order conditions and that more productive firms post higher
wages and firms with the same productivity post the same wage. The condition (Assumption
3 in that paper) guarantees that all firms attract applicants with positive probability (pj > 0
for all j) and it is given by:
C1: For all j ∈M we have pj(w) > 0 where w = (x1, ..., , xm).
It is easy to show that Condition C1 holds as long as the maximum wages that firms are
willing to offer are not too far apart, i.e. there exists parameter γ < 1 such that C1 holds if
minj xj > γmaxj xj. Note that Condition C1 is sufficient but not necessary for our results.
14See Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) for a detailed derivation.
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Consider the firms’ problem. Under (C1), all firms attract applications and the solu-
tions to the firms’ problem are characterized by their first order conditions. The first order
conditions of the firm’s problem are
dΠj
dwj
= −H(pj) + h(pj) [xj − wj] dpj
dwj
. (18)
Equating (18) to zero for all j and rearranging leads to:
xj
xk
=
h(pk)
h(pj)
h(pj) wj +
H(pj)
dpj/dwj
h(pk) wk +
H(pk)
dpk/dwk
, (19)
which characterizes the equilibrium. Let {p∗1, ..., p∗m} denote the equilibrium allocation.
4.2 Efficiency Properties of Equilibrium
We now generalize the results of section 3.2. We show that constrained efficiency does not
obtain except for the special case of homogeneous firms and that in equilibrium the more
productive firms hire less frequently than is efficient.
The planner’s optimization problem is given by
max
p
m∑
j=1
H(pj) xj (20)
s.t.
m∑
j=1
pj = 1 and pj ≥ 0 ∀j ∈M
Let {pP1 , ..., pPm} denote the planner’s constrained efficient allocation.
Equation (20) yields the following first order conditions:
h(pj) xj ≤ λ
= λ if pj > 0, ∀j ∈M,
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. This condition requires that the shadow value in terms
of expected output is equal across all firms that attract applications. Therefore, for any two
firms j and k with pj, pk > 0 the following has to hold:
xj
xk
=
h(pPk )
h(pPj )
= (
1− pPk
1− pPj
)n−1. (21)
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Comparing the efficiency requirement (21) with the equilibrium condition (19) reveals that
efficiency is only achieved when the second ratio of (19) is equal to one for all pairs of firms.
This can be easily verified to hold for the case when firms are homogeneous (x1 = ... = xm)
and workers apply to each firm with identical probability (Galenianos and Kircher (2009b)
establish that homogeneous firms post the same wage and therefore efficiency obtains in that
case). However, we will show that when firms are heterogeneous, this ratio is different from
one.
The proposition states our results regarding the efficiency properties of equilibrium. The
proof is in the appendix.
Proposition 4.1 Assume (C1) holds.
(1) If xj 6= xk for some j, k ∈M , then constrained efficiency does not obtain in equilibrium.
Furthermore, there exists an r ∈ {1, 2, ...,m} such that p∗j < pPj for j ∈ {1, ..., r} and p∗j > pPj
for j ∈ {r + 1, ....,m}.
(2) If xj = xk for all j, k ∈M , then constrained efficiency obtains in equilibrium.
Proof. See the appendix.
4.3 Policy Implications
We now generalize the policy implications of section 3.3. We first show analytically that
the results of section 3.3 hold when firms have two productivity levels. We then provide
some computational evidence that they extend to more general productivity distributions,
although we have not been able to provide a proof.
Let x1 > x2 and suppose thatm1 andm2 is the number of high and low productivity firms,
respectively. Assume that condition (C1) holds. The characterization results in Galenianos
and Kircher (2009b) guarantee that in the unconstrained equilibrium all high productivity
firms post w∗1 and all low productivity firms post w
∗
2.
We first consider the welfare effect of imposing a binding minimum wage:
Proposition 4.2 Aggregate welfare is strictly higher in any unconstrained equilibrium {w∗1, w∗2}
than at an equilibrium with a minimum wage w ∈ (w∗2, x2).
Proof. See the appendix.
In contrast, unemployment benefits can implement the efficient outcome.
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Proposition 4.3 There exist unemployment benefits b∗ > 0, such that an equilibrium with
these unemployment benefits is constrained efficient.
Proof. See the appendix.
The following figures provide numerical evidence that the logic behind the above results
holds in the general environment with a larger number of different productivity levels. In
both figures there are five equidistant productivity levels (x1 = 3, x2 = 2.5, ..., x5 = 1) with
s firms at each level (mj = s for all j). In each case the number of worker is equal to the
number of firms (n = 5s). The vertical axis denotes the percentage change in welfare due to
a policy change as a proportion of the original inefficiency.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the efficiency loss relative to the unconstrained equilibrium when a
minimum wage is introduced.
In figure 1, the policy in question is the minimum wage which is denoted as a ratio over the
lowest unconstrained equilibrium wage on the horizontal axis. Consistent with our previous
results, it is clear that the efficiency loss increases when the minimum wage is introduced.
Different specifications of productivity and s yield qualitatively similar graphs which leads
us to believe that this is a more general result.
In figure 2, the level of the unemployment benefit is on the horizontal axis. The produc-
tivity levels and number of agents are the same as above. This figure shows two things: first,
moderate unemployment benefits improve welfare; second, the optimal level of unemployment
benefits decreases in the market size (s) which reflects the fact that the decentralized alloca-
tion approaches efficiency as the market becomes larger. Note that it is not always possible
to fully achieve efficiency due to the interaction between various productivity levels that can-
not be completely fine-tuned with a single policy instrument. However when unemployment
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Figure 2: Illustration of the efficiency loss (efficiency gain if the numbers are smaller than 1)
from the introduction of unemployment benefits.
benefits are chosen optimally the efficiency losses in our example are substantially reduced
even under multiple productivity levels. Again, the features we present are representative of
the numerical examples with different number of firms and productivity levels.
5 Conclusions
We develop a frictional model of the labor market with two main features: firms enjoy
market power which leads to inefficiencies in the decentralized allocation; and wages play an
important role in allocating labor. The nature of the inefficiency is that low-productivity
firms hire too often and unemployment is too low from a welfare point of view. We show
that unemployment benefits can increase welfare because they increase workers’ willingness
to risk unemployment and look for better employment options, thus, in effect, limiting firms’
market power. In contrast, a minimum wage forces the low-productivity firms to increase
their wages thereby exacerbating the inefficiencies. The employment results put the recent
debate on minimum wages into perspective (e.g. Card and Krueger (1994)): while most
papers have focused on the employment effects of a minimum wage, we show that the welfare
implications of such policy can be more complicated. Even when it is desirable to transfer
surplus towards workers (in our case because of the firms’ market power), a minimum wage
may have additional undesirable distortionary effects.
We highlight a particular channel through which inefficiencies may arise, namely the mar-
ket power that firms enjoy in the context of a small market. Since many labor markets are
fragmented across occupational and geographical lines, we think that this is a case worth
studying. For instance, following Shimer (2007) and restricting a labor market to an occupa-
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tion and geographical area combination leads to as few as 10 unemployed workers per labor
market on average with a correspondingly small number of hiring firms.15 While workers
arguably search across some geographical borders and across some occupational boundaries,
this calculation suggests that a strategic view of the hiring process might be relevant for the
labor market experience of a significant proportion of workers.
The positive implications of the two policies that we consider do not depend on the
finite nature of the market. We conjecture that models where there is some surplus to the
employment relationship (e.g. due to frictions) and where wages play some role in allocating
labor share our model’s positive predictions: a (moderate) binding minimum wage constraints
the low productivity firms, forcing them to offer better wages and hence leads to a reallocation
of labor towards such firms. Unemployment benefits, on the other hand, may reallocate
workers toward high-productivity firms, depending on the particulars of the model. The
welfare effects of these policies depend on whether the original equilibrium is efficient or not.
In the case of a large market with risk neutral agents (e.g. Shi (2001) or Shimer (2005)),
constrained efficiency obtains in the decentralized equilibrium and policy can only reduce
welfare. If one thinks that workers’ risk aversion plays a significant role (as in Acemog˘lu
and Shimer (1999)) then we conjecture that our main normative insights carry over: in
an extension of that model with heterogeneous firms, low productivity firms hire too often
from an efficiency viewpoint, a minimum wage worsens the inefficiency and unemployment
benefits can help. Of course, it may turn out that firm entry, from which we have abstracted,
is important in the this context.
15Shimer (2007) proposes the combination of occupation and geographical unit as a labor market. With
a total of 362 metropolitan and 560 micropolitan statistical areas (regions with at least one urbanized area
of more than 50,000 inhabitants and 10,000 to 50,000 urban inhabitants, respectively) and about 800 oc-
cupations listed in the Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) and he obtains a total of about 740,000
combinations of occupations and geographic areas. For an unemployment level of 7.6 million in the Cur-
rent Employment Statistics (CES) of December 2007 this yields on average 10.4 unemployed people per
combination of occupation and geographical area.
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6 Appendix
Proposition 4.1:
Proof. For simplicity, assume that no two firms have the same productivity level, though the
complimentary case can be handled with minor modifications. Note that the characterization
result from Galenianos and Kircher (2009b) implies that p1 > p2 > ... > pm > 0.
We proceed to compare the probabilities implied by the solution to the planner’s problem
to the ones from the decentralized firms’ problem. First, note that pPj = 0 is a possibility
for some j ∈ M . In that case, it is straightforward to show that there exists some t such
that pP1 > p
P
2 > ..., p
P
t > 0 and p
P
t+1 = ... = p
P
m = 0, which means that the low productivity
firms (below the tth) hire too often in the decentralized allocation, as the statement of the
proposition suggests.
In what follows, we restrict attention to those firms that is efficient to attract applications
in the constrained efficient allocation. The efficient probabilities are given by equation (21)
which we compare to the probabilities from the decentralized allocation (19). We want to
show that for all j < k
1− pPk
1− pPj
>
1− pk
1− pj , (22)
which implies the claim of the proposition. We establish equation (22) for j = 1 and k = 2
but the proof is identical for other values of j and k.
Recalling that U(w) = G(pi(w)) wi, for all pi > 0, the problem of firm 1 is
max
w1
H(p1(w)) (x1 − w1)
s.t. G(p1(w)) w1 = G(p2(w)) w2
which is equivalent to: maxw1 [(1− (1− p1)n) x1−n p1 G(p2) w2] where the argument w has
been omitted for brevity. Setting the first order condition of this problem to zero yields
(1− p1)n−1x1 ∂p1
∂w1
= w2[g(p2)
∂p2
∂w1
p1 +G(p2)
∂p1
∂w1
].
Performing the same calculation for firm 2 and combining the results yields
w1
w2
= (
1− p2
1− p1 )
n−1x2
x1
∂p2
∂w2
[g(p2)
∂p2
∂w1
p1 +G(p2)
∂p1
∂w1
]
∂p1
∂w1
[g(p1)
∂p1
∂w2
p2 +G(p1)
∂p2
∂w2
]
.
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Using the indifference condition of the buyers, G(p1) w1 = G(p2) w2, leads to
x1
x2
= (
1− p2
1− p1 )
n−1G(p1)
G(p2)
∂p2
∂w2
[g(p2)
∂p2
∂w1
p1 +G(p2)
∂p1
∂w1
]
∂p1
∂w1
[g(p1)
∂p1
∂w2
p2 +G(p1)
∂p2
∂w2
]
.
If
G(p1)
G(p2)
∂p2
∂w2
[g(p2)
∂p2
∂w1
p1 +G(p2)
∂p1
∂w1
]
∂p1
∂w1
[g(p1)
∂p1
∂w2
p2 +G(p1)
∂p2
∂w2
]
> 1 (23)
then equation (22) holds and we have our result. The rest of the proof establishes (23).
Equation (23) holds if and only if
p1 g(p2)
∂p2
∂w1
/ ∂p1
∂w1
p2 g(p1)
∂p1
∂w2
/ ∂p2
∂w2
>
G(p2)
G(p1)
. (24)
We want to characterize ∂pi/∂wl. Note that p1+...+pm = 1⇒ ∂p1/∂wi+...+∂pm/∂wi =
0. Let ρi ≡ g(pi)/G(pi). We can differentiate the equality G(p1) w1 −G(pi) wi = 0 for i > 2
with respect to w2 to get (where the equality was used again to substitute out the wages)
∂pi
∂w2
=
∂p1
∂w2
ρ1
ρi
Therefore,
∂p2
∂w2
= −[ ∂p1
∂w2
+
∂p2
∂w2
+ ...+
∂pm
∂w2
] = − ∂p1
∂w2
ρ1 [
1
ρ1
+
1
ρ3
+ ...+
1
ρm
]
⇒ ∂p1
∂w2
/
∂p2
∂w2
= −
1
ρ1
1
ρ1
+ 1
ρ3
+ 1
ρ4
+ ...+ 1
ρm
.
We can characterize (∂p2/∂w1)/(∂p1/∂w1) in a similar way. Using these results, we can
rewrite (24) as
p1ρ1(1 + 2(1− p2) + ...+ (n− 1)(1− p2)n−2)
p2ρ2(1 + 2(1− p1) + ...+ (n− 1)(1− p1)n−2)
1
ρ1
+ 1
ρ3
+ 1
ρ4
+ ...+ 1
ρm
1
ρ2
+ 1
ρ3
+ 1
ρ4
+ ...+ 1
ρm
>
1 + (1− p2) + ...+ (1− p2)n−1
1 + (1− p1) + ...+ (1− p1)n−1 . (25)
The definition of ρ implies that
ρ1
ρ2
=
(1 + 2(1− p1) + ...+ (n− 1)(1− p1)n−2)
(1 + 2(1− p2) + ...+ (n− 1)(1− p2)n−2)
1 + (1− p2) + ...+ (1− p2)n−1
1 + (1− p1) + ...+ (1− p1)n−1 . (26)
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Case 1: 0 > ρ1 > ρ2
In this case
1
ρ1
+ 1
ρ3
+ 1
ρ4
+ ...+ 1
ρm
1
ρ2
+ 1
ρ3
+ 1
ρ4
+ ...+ 1
ρm
> 1
and thus (25) follows from
p1ρ1(1 + 2(1− p2) + ...+ (n− 1)(1− p2)n−2)
p2ρ2(1 + 2(1− p1) + ...+ (n− 1)(1− p1)n−2) >
1 + ...+ (1− p2)n−1
1 + ...+ (1− p1)n−1 .
However, using (26) this last inequality is equivalent to p1 > p2 which holds since x1 > x2.
Case 2: 0 > ρ2 ≥ ρ1
In this case it holds that
ρ1
ρ2
1
ρ1
+ 1
ρ3
+ 1
ρ4
+ ...+ 1
ρm
1
ρ2
+ 1
ρ3
+ 1
ρ4
+ ...+ 1
ρm
=
1 + ρ1(
1
ρ3
+ 1
ρ4
+ ...+ 1
ρm
)
1 + ρ2(
1
ρ3
+ 1
ρ4
+ ...+ 1
ρm
)
≥ 1,
because ρi < 0 for all i. Then (25) follows from
p1(1 + 2(1− p2) + ...+ (n− 1)(1− p2)n−2)
p2(1 + 2(1− p1) + ...+ (n− 1)(1− p1)n−2) >
1 + (1− p2) + ...+ (1− p2)n−1
1 + (1− p1) + ...+ (1− p1)n−1 ,
which can be rewritten as
1− (1− p1)n
1 + ...+ (n− 1)(1− p1)n−2 >
1− (1− p2)n
1 + ...+ (n− 1)(1− p2)n−2 .
This inequality holds holds because p1 > p2.
Proposition 4.2:
Proof. Let p∗i be the equilibrium application probability of workers to firm i when no
minimum wage is introduced, and let pi(w) be the application probability when the minimum
wage is introduced. Let (w1(w), w2(w)) refer to an equilibrium wage offer profile if a minimum
wage requirement is introduced.
First, it is easy to show that
w1(w) ≥ w2(w).
Moreover, w1(w) = w2(w) implies that w1(w) = w2(w) = w, i.e. the minimum wage is so high
that it is binding even for the high productivity firm. In this case obviously p1(w) = p2(w)
holds and thus the equilibrium application levels are further from the constrained efficient
allocation than without a minimum wage, since without the minimum wage at least p1 > p2
could be ensured.
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Consider now the case where w1 > w2 ≥ w. In this case a high productivity firm chooses
his wage offer such that his marginal profit is zero, since such a firm does not face a binding
minimum wage. Let w1(p1, w2, ŵ1) denote the (unique) wage level that a high productivity
firm needs to offer to obtain an application probability of p1, if low productivity firms offer a
wage of w2 and the other high productivity firms offer a wage of ŵ1. It is easy to show that
w1(p1, αw2, αŵ1) = αw1(p1, w2, ŵ1).
Now, we show that if w2 increases, then the high productivity firms obtain lower application
probabilities in equilibrium, which would prove the result, since this means that increasing
the minimum wage (and thus w2) moves the allocation even further from the constrained
efficient allocation. To prove this claim take any given p1 and let ŵ1 be such that if all high
productivity firms offer this wage, then each of them is visited with probability p1. Let us
denote this value as w∗1(p1, w2) and note that
w1(p1, w2, w
∗
1(p1, w2)) = w
∗
1(p1, w2).
Suppose that a high productivity firm, firm i considers a deviation in his wage to change the
application probability he receives. If he achieves an application probability of p˜1, then his
profit can be written as
Π1(p˜1, w2, p1) = (x1 − w1(p˜1, w2, w∗1(p1, w2)))H1(p˜1).
Linearity of w∗1 in w2 implies that
w∗1(p1, αw2) = αw
∗
1(p1, w2),
and thus linearity of function w1 in w2 and ŵ1 implies that
w1(p˜1, αw2, w
∗
1(p1, αw2))) = αw1(p˜1, w2, w
∗
1(p1, w2))).
Now, let us study the marginal profit of firm i from increasing p˜1 when p˜1 = p1 and the low
productivity firms offer w2. This marginal profit can be written as
β(w2, p1) =
∂(x1 − w1(p˜1, w2, w∗1(p1, w2)))H1(p˜1)
∂p˜1
|p˜1=p1=
=
∂(x1 − w2w1(p˜1, 1, w∗1(p1, 1)))H1(p˜1)
∂p˜1
|p˜1=p1 .
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It is immediate that
∂β(w2, p1)
∂w2
< 0
holds. Therefore, if w2 > w
U
2 then β(w2, p
U
1 ) < 0. Moreover, it holds that β(w2, 0) > 0,
since attracting an extra customer when no one is planning to visit is always profitable. By
continuity of function β it follows that there exists a value p1 ∈ (0, pU1 ), such that β(w2, p1) =
0. By construction, if all other high productivity firms offer a wage of w∗1(p1, w2) and low
productivity firms offer w2, then any given high productivity firm cannot gain by changing his
wage offer by deviating from w∗1(p1, w2) slightly. However, Galenianos and Kircher (2009b)
show that under assumption C1 the profit function is concave in the own wage variable and
thus offering w∗1(p1, w2) is a best reply for all high productivity firms.
Therefore, for every wage level of the low productivity firms, such that w2 > w
U
2 , there
is an equilibrium in the game between only the high productivity firms (i.e. taking w2 as
given) such that the workers’ application probability to high productivity firms goes down if
low productivity firms all offered wage w2, because p1 < p
U
1 .
The proof is completed by showing that for every w2 the best response in the game of high
productivity firms is unique. The tedious algebra for this result can be obtained from the au-
thors upon request (or see the technical appendix on http://galenian.googlepages.com/research).
Proposition 4.3:
Proof. Let pj(b) denote the probability with which a worker applies to some firm of pro-
ductivity xj when the level of unemployment benefits is given by b. Assume without loss of
generality that x1 > x2. Under (C1) both firms attract applications when b = 0. If p
∗
2 = 0,
then setting b = x2 implements the constrained efficient allocation. The rest of the proof
considers the case where pP2 > 0.
The strategy of the proof is to show that there is a b∗ such that the firms’ first order
conditions coincide with the ones of the planner. Constrained efficiency is given by
x1
x2
= (
1− pP2
1− pP1
)n−1 > (
1− p∗2
1− p∗1
)n−1,
where the inequality follows from the argument used in the proof of Proposition 4.1 (noting
that in our notation p∗j = pj(0)).
As shown in Section 3, an unemployment benefit is mathematically equivalent to lowering
the productivity of every firm by b leading to the following equilibrium condition for the
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decentralized economy:
x1 − b
x2 − b = (
1− p2(b)
1− p1(b))
n−1G(p1(b))
G(p2(b))
∂p2
∂w2
[g(p2(b))
∂p2
∂w1
p1(b) +G(p2(b))
∂p1
∂w1
]
∂p1
∂w1
[g(p1(b))
∂p1
∂w2
p2(b) +G(p1(b))
∂p2
∂w2
]
We use the intermediate value theorem to conclude the proof. Note that for b close enough
to x2
x1 − b
x2 − b > (
1− p2(b)
1− p1(b))
n−1 G(p1(b))
G(p2(b))
∂p2
∂w2
[g(p2(b))
∂p2
∂w1
p1(b) +G(p2(b))
∂p1
∂w1
]
∂p1
∂w1
[g(p1(b))
∂p1
∂w2
p2(b) +G(p1(b))
∂p2
∂w2
]
.
If b = 0, then
x1 − b
x2 − b = (
1− p2(b)
1− p1(b))
n−1 < (
1− p2(b)
1− p1(b))
n−1G(p1(b))
G(p2(b))
∂p2
∂w2
[g(p2(b))
∂p2
∂w1
p1(b) +G(p2(b))
∂p1
∂w1
]
∂p1
∂w1
[g(p1(b))
∂p1
∂w2
p2(b) +G(p1(b))
∂p2
∂w2
]
.
Therefore, an appropriate value of b ∈ [0, x2) works to replicate the constrained efficient
allocation.
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